Transgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protections Against Wrongful Employment Termination on the Basis of the Transgender Identity by Marino, Anton
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 4
2013
Transgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding
Legal Protections Against Wrongful Employment
Termination on the Basis of the Transgender
Identity
Anton Marino
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marino, Anton. "Transgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protections Against Wrongful Employment Termination on
the Basis of the Transgender Identity,” American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 21, no. 4 (2013): 865-891.
 865 
TRANSGRESSIONS OF INEQUALITY: 
THE STRUGGLE FINDING LEGAL 
PROTECTIONS AGAINST WRONGFUL 
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ON THE 
BASIS OF THE TRANSGENDER 
IDENTITY 
ANTON MARINO* 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................ 865 
II. The Complexities of Sex and Gender Defined ..................................... 869 
III. The Failure to Achieve Gender Equality for the Transgender 
Individual Under the Equal Protection Doctrine ............................ 873 
IV. The Flawed Application of Understanding of Identity ........................ 877 
V. The Conflict Defined: The Uncertainty of Protections Afforded 
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ............................. 882 
VI. Redefining “Gender Discrimination” and Broadening The Scope 
of Protection .................................................................................... 890 
VII. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 893 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What defines a man or a woman?  What are the differences between the 
two?  Stereotypically, a man is seen as handsome, strong, instinctive, and 
assertive.  In contrast, a woman is often described as beautiful, soft, patient, 
and understanding.  Notwithstanding these archaic understandings of sex 
and gender-based stereotypes, who has the authority to say that a man 
cannot be whatever a woman is and that a woman cannot be whatever a 
man is? 
How we each individually identify as human beings directly affects how 
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we operate as a civilization, as a society, and as a species.1  This core sense 
of “self” governs how we traverse through our daily lives.2  What happens, 
however, when the way we construe our inborn identity is in direct conflict 
with the way others perceive our identity?  To members of the transgender 
community, this conflict is inescapable, and the law has provided little 
protective recourse for such conflicts as they arise within the workplace—
resulting in a gravely uncertain situation for transgender employees.3 
For at least thirty-four years, members of the transgender community 
have struggled to assert legal protections that preclude employers from 
engaging in discriminatory conduct ultimately resulting in their 
termination.4  This discriminatory conduct originates in the same sex-
normative stereotypes—stereotypes that mandate how the male and female 
sexes are “supposed” to behave and how the bodies of a man and woman 
are “supposed” to appear—that have fueled the unequal treatment of not 
just transgender people, but also female, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.5 
As a result, the use of workplace restrooms, one of the last spaces 
segregated on the basis of a sexual binary,6 has created glaring 
                                                          
 1. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That 
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007); 
Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. 
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson 
& Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 
1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 4. Compare Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218 (concluding that neither Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act nor an Equal Protection argument brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
afforded a transgender individual any remedy at law against her former employer for 
terminating her on the basis of her transgender identity), and Holloway, 566 F.2d at 
661 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to a transgender 
claimant’s former employer and holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act neither 
contemplates nor embraces transgender/transsexual discrimination), with Glenn v. 
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district court’s judgment 
in favor of a transgender individual wrongfully terminated from her workplace on the 
basis of gender stereotyping, and concluding that sex-based discrimination premised on 
“gender-noncomformity” is subject to the heightened scrutiny of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 5. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to 
Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 37, 38 (2000); see Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality 
Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. 
REV. 159, 179 (2002); see also Anthony v. Alfieri, (Un)covering Identity in Civil 
Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 805, 812-13, 826-27 (2007). 
 6. Lara E. Pomerantz, Comment, Winning the Housing Lottery: Changing 
University Housing Policies for Transgender Students, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1215, 
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psychological and physical harms for members of the transgender 
community.7  Moreover, because the discrimination faced by members of 
the transgender community is indelibly connected to the issues of gender 
and sex, workplace bathroom use and sex-specific workplace attire 
emphasize how innate identity and the way others perceive the trans-
identity are in direct conflict.8  Thus, transgender individuals’ workplaces 
have developed into battlegrounds on which the fight for transgender 
equality has, in large part, been disastrous.9 
Federal appellate courts are divided over whether an employer may 
terminate a transgendered employee’s occupational post on the basis of his 
or her status as a transgender individual irrespective of protections that 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may provide.10  This split of 
                                                          
1234 (2009). 
 7. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: 
What Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 115, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Feldblum, The Right to Define]; Boaz I. Green, 
Discussions and Expression of Gender and Sexuality in Schools, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 329, 333 n.30 (2004); Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of 
Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments 
Paving the Way to the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 
896 (2006). 
 8. Elkind, supra note 7, at 921; see also infra Part II and note 15. 
 9. See e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 
748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. 
Ohio 2003); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 
1993); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 726 (Minn. 2001); see also Hispanic AIDS 
Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45-46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 10. Compare Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding 
that sex-based discrimination premised on “gender-noncomformity” is subject to the 
heightened scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
further observing that, had the transgender plaintiff filed a claim under the Civil Rights 
Act, Title VII would have equally provided her a remedy at law), Smith v. City of 
Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing the district court’s 
narrow statutory interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because the Act 
contemplates instances of sex-discrimination on the basis of the claimant’s “appearance 
and mannerism”), and Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 
2002) (per curiam) (upholding the district court’s finding that a school’s policy of 
allowing a transgender employee to use the restroom of the gender with which she 
identified neither violated another teacher’s religious freedoms nor any other actionable 
discrimination claim), with Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224 (holding that neither Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act nor the Equal Protection Clause afforded a transgender employee 
any legal recourse against her former workplace for wrongfully terminating her on the 
basis of her status as a transgender person), Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 
1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984) (determining that discrimination against transgender 
persons does not fall within the ambit of Title VII), Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750 
(affirming the District Court’s finding that the plain meaning of the language in Title 
VII must be ascribed to the common meaning of the term “sex,” which, it concluded, 
3
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authority originates from the judiciary’s conflation and disaggregation of 
the meaning of sex and gender as well as its failure to recognize that gender 
operates as a continuum along which male and female represent the 
extremes, and not as a restrictive binary construct of male and female.11  
“Gender discrimination” is substantially more complex than conduct 
resulting in the disparate treatment of an individual premised on the 
prejudices regarding that person’s sex.  “Gender discrimination” attacks the 
very core of an individual’s innate identity and that individual’s ability to 
manifest his or her own destiny.  Accordingly, “gender discrimination” is a 
violation of an individual’s substantive due process right to liberty.12 
This Article will proceed in five parts.  Part II wrestles with the 
definitions of sex and gender and explains why the failure to explicate the 
complexity of these terms is particularly pernicious to the transgender 
individual.  Part III traces the failure of the Supreme Court’s “gender 
discrimination” jurisprudence to provide a workable standard that combats 
the legal disparities suffered by those whose identities are classified as “the 
others.”13  It provides a detailed examination and evaluation of why the 
Court’s simultaneous conflation and disaggregation of sex and gender and 
its failure to recognize a gender continuum reaffirms the socially-created 
inferiority of women, homosexuals, bisexuals, and transgender people.  
Part IV examines the Court’s understanding of innate identity.  In 
particular, it assesses how the Court has addressed the legal disparities that 
                                                          
provided no protections for trans-identifying individuals), and Holloway v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Title VII fails to 
embrace transgender/transsexual discrimination), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 11. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11, 25, 40 (1995); Francisco 
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” 
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (1995); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 353, 359-60 (2000). 
 12. See Rebecca Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1541 
(2002); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to 
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749-50 (2011); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 574 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 512 n.1 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kahn v. 
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973).  
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996); J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Frontiero, 411 
U.S. at 690-91 (plurality opinion). 
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the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities face.  Part V examines how 
Title VII might be applied to transgender employees seeking legal 
protection within the workplace.  Finally, Part VI calls for a re-evaluation 
of what the Court currently considers “gender discrimination” and proposes 
a new standard by which the Court should apply protections. 
 
II. THE COMPLEXITIES OF SEX AND GENDER DEFINED 
The concepts of sex and gender are related to the very core of one’s own 
sense of identity.14  Each individual maintains a particularized sex and 
gender.  There are many, however, whose particularized sex and gender 
manifest in conflict, requiring us to engage in a thoughtful analysis about 
the meaning of both terms.15  A failure to thoughtfully explore these 
definitions can produce substantially inconsistent applications of the law 
and can even undermine entire legal doctrines.16 
Nevertheless, since 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
struggled to define the concepts of sex and gender in its attempts to extend 
equal protection of the law under a theory of “gender discrimination.”17  To 
a large degree, the Court has conflated the concepts of sex and gender by 
using the terms interchangeably, signaling inaccurately that every person’s 
                                                          
 14. See Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 124. 
 15. The terms “sex” and “gender” are encumbered with nuances and ambiguities 
that are not easily conveyed.  Pomerantz, supra note 6, at 1221 (citing Judith Butler, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity (1990)); see also Elaine Crain, 
Trans-phobia and the Relational Production of Gender, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
137, 138-39 (2007); Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The 
Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 84 
(2008); Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and 
Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 256-58 (2005). 
 16. See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256, 285 
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s perpetuation of discriminatory 
conduct it previously deemed invalid); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the Court’s misconceived understanding of its previous opinion 
within Frontiero); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (concluding that 
pregnancy is not sex discrimination within the context of the Equal Protection Clause).  
 17. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (plurality opinion) (holding that classifications 
based on sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, and 
that statutes providing, solely for administrative convenience, that spouses of male 
members of the armed services are dependents for purposes of obtaining increased 
quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits, but that spouses of female 
members are not dependents unless they are in fact dependent for over one-half of their 
support, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by requiring a female member to prove dependency of her husband). 
5
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sex is also that person’s gender.18  On other occasions, members of the 
Court have rejected this conflation, and, in turn, have derisively attempted 
to define the terms in a simplistic, disaggregated fashion.19  Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.20 provides such 
an example: 
The word “gender” has acquired the new and useful connotation of 
cultural attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) 
distinctive of the sexes.  That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to 
female and masculine is to male.21 
Undoubtedly, to Justice Scalia, “cultural attitudinal characteristics,”22 or 
what he defines as “gender,” are neither what the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates nor what the Equal Protection 
Clause intended to reach, because “attitudinal characteristics,” by their very 
nature, are mutable.23 
Neither of these definitions adequately describes the complexity of sex 
and gender.  Indeed, defining sex solely based on the anatomical presence 
of a penis or a vagina or on one’s chromosomal configurations is logically 
and scientifically insufficient.24  Researchers hypothesize that between one 
                                                          
 18. See, e.g., Feeny, 442 U.S. at 274-75; Craig, 429 U.S. at 192; Schlesinger, 419 
U.S. at 509-10; Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974). 
 19. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 157 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 20. 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 21. Id. at 156 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Cf. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (citing 
United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)) (viewing 
Carolene Products as providing guidance into the immutability component of 
heightened judicial scrutiny within the context of equal protection as defined as 
“discrete and insular” groups); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1975).  The 
leading formulation for heightened scrutiny within the Equal Protection analysis 
derives from footnote four of Carolene Products, where the Court opined that “discrete 
and insular minorities” constitute what are now acknowledged as suspect classes.  See 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.  In that regard, the Court oftentimes asks 
whether an offender’s discriminatory conduct is based on an “immutable characteristic” 
of the suspect class.  See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) 
(plurality opinion). 
 24. P.L. Chau & Jonathan Herring, Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex, 16 
INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM., 327, 329-32 (2002); Franke, supra note 11, at 5, 40; Phyllis 
Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. the Cider House Rules: 
Transgenders Struggle with the Courts Over What Clothing They are Allowed to Wear 
on the Job, Which Restroom They Are Allowed to Use on the Job, the Right to Marry, 
and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 168 (2000) 
(noting other chromosomal variations outside the scope of the generally accepted 
binary construction of XY and XX).  See generally Jill Rebecca Oliver, A 
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and four percent of the world’s population maintains chromosomal 
variations that are not in harmony with archaic understandings of how the 
judiciary and the Euro-American culture define man and woman—an 
understanding that totally disregards the existence of intersexuality.25  
Recent medical studies further demonstrate that a person’s sex is comprised 
of a total of nine different factors.26  Sex is biological, but it is entirely too 
complex a concept to reduce to genetic composition or the primary sex 
organs of an individual.  Accordingly, sex is best described as the outside 
physical or perceived surface identity of a person.27 
Gender, however, refers to a person’s innate core identity: a person’s 
true sense of self.28  Gender-expression is the manifestation of one’s inner 
self and is frequently equated with socially normative, dichotomous Euro-
American stereotypes of what it means to be a man or a woman.  But, a 
person’s gender may reject this dichotomy or the socially normative roles 
the dichotomy belies.  Although gender is connected to one’s psyche, it is 
no less biological than sex because it influences one’s sexual 
development.29  But sole reliance on the biomedical sciences ultimately 
provides no formulaic means to completely distinguish sex from gender 
because they are interrelated.30  Gender influences sexual development, and 
sex may assist one in understanding one’s gender.  Therefore, when the 
Court engages in a colloquy on the topic of what it calls “gender 
discrimination,” it must neither assume that sex and gender are identical 
nor that sex and gender are severable. 
As one wrestles with attempts to define the terms, one must be mindful 
that each person has a particularized sex and gender.  In that regard, a large 
majority of the population maintains a gender that manifests itself 
correlative to one’s sex.  Alternatively, however, there are many whose 
gender manifests itself in conflict with their sex.  These persons transcend 
and resist society’s normative sex stereotypes, and identify as members of 
                                                          
Multidimensional Model of Biological Sex (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Waterloo) (on file with University of Waterloo’s Institutional 
Repository), available at 
http://www.uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/10012/6444/1/Oliver_Jill.pdf. 
 25. Frye, supra note 24, at 147, 168. 
 26. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing to 
the scientific findings of Dr. Wallace Bockting, a tenured associate professor at the 
University of Minnesota Medical School who specializes in what the court labeled 
“gender identity disorders”); Valdes, supra note 11, at 20 (citing elements that are 
considered in determining one’s sex). 
 27. Cf. Franke, supra note 11, at 35; Frye, supra note 24, at 161. 
 28. Franke, supra note 11, at 35; Frye, supra note 24, at 169. 
 29. See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306; see also Franke, supra note 11, at 34-36. 
 30. See Franke, supra note 11, at 1-3. 
7
Marino: Transgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protecti
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
872 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:4 
the transgender community.31  
Notwithstanding the complexities of these terms, the United States 
Supreme Court’s development of “gender discrimination” jurisprudence 
demonstrates a failure to understand the complex interrelationship of sex 
and gender,32 in turn, foreclosing constitutional protections to the 
transgender person.  Indeed, the Court’s acknowledgment of what it has 
deemed as the relevant differences between the male and female sexes 
eviscerates any possibility of truly achieving total gender equality.33  As a 
result, the Court’s failure to provide a viable standard to combat what it has 
titled “gender discrimination” has provided little legal remedy and no 
constitutional protections for the transgender individual in the workplace.34 
                                                          
 31. Many appellate courts have relied on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders’ fourth edition (“DSM-IV”).  See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 
1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th 
Cir. 1984).  However, DSM-IV provides a perfunctory appreciation for members of the 
transgender community and trivializes the trans-identity by referencing it as “gender 
identity disorder.”  CHESTER W. SCHMIDT ET AL., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 532–33 (Michael B. First et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994).  
Further it completely dismisses an actual understanding of sex and gender 
incongruence by suggesting cursory examples of a mere “desire” to disassociate from 
normative sex stereotypical behavior as being clearly symptomatic of transgenderism.  
Id. at 533-34.  This hasty evaluation of what it means to be transgender should be 
rejected.  One can only hope that the relabeling of “gender identity disorder” to “gender 
dysphoria” in DSM-V—released in May 2013—presents a more favorable appreciation 
and deeper understanding of transgenderism and transsexuality.  Camille Beredjick, 
DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender Dysphoria’, ADVOCATE.COM 
(July 23, 2012, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-
identity-disorder-gender-dysphoria; see also Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under 
the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3, 4 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. 
Juang & Shannon Prince Minter eds., 2006). 
 32. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); Meritor Sav. 
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); see also Franke, supra note 11, at 1; Valdes, supra 
note 11, at 20-21. 
 33. See, e.g., Nyugen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001); United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 157 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 34. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 
2007); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 
(8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 
1977); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994); 
Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993); K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of 
Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1977). 
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III. THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE GENDER EQUALITY FOR THE TRANSGENDER 
INDIVIDUAL UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has struggled to provide a 
standard capable of providing equal protection of the law and to address 
cases premised on issues of “gender discrimination.”35  In the watershed 
opinion, Frontiero v. Richardson,36 a plurality of the Court finally 
acknowledged the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” 
within the United States.37  Writing for the plurality, Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr., traced the indoctrinated legal subjugation of the female sex 
back one hundred years to Justice Joseph P. Bradley’s concurring opinion 
in Bradwell v. State of Illinois.38  Through Justice Brennan’s colloquy, the 
Court noted several examples of the legal injustices suffered by the female 
sex, including a woman’s inability to hold office, serve on juries, file legal 
claims in her own name, hold or convey property in her own name, or serve 
as legal guardians for her own children.39  In recognizing that the legal 
subjugation of the female sex was based on “gross, stereotyped 
distinctions,” which, “in practical effect put women, not on a pedestal, but 
in a cage,”40 a plurality of the Court invalidated a law that applied different 
standards for male and female service members’ spouses seeking to obtain 
increased quarter allowances.41 
At first blush, the plurality’s holding in Frontiero v. Richardson appears 
to be a phenomenal victory, providing the applicable standard by which 
courts will analyze “gender discrimination” claims.  The plurality, 
however, failed to state with particularity that the government’s 
unconstitutionally discriminatory conduct is not occasioned merely by the 
presence of certain rudimentary biological indicators.42  Rather, the 
plurality actually reasoned its analysis on societal, normative sex-based 
stereotypes.  To be sure, “gender discriminatory” conduct does not infringe 
merely upon the physicality of one’s person; it violates the very core of 
one’s conception of identity by categorically placing an individual within 
                                                          
 35. See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 
(1973) (plurality opinion). 
 36. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 (plurality opinion). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 684-85 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring)) (noting that it was contrary to the “law of the Creator” for a woman to 
adopt a distinct and independent career from that of her husband because the 
“paramount destiny and mission of woman” is that of mother and wife). 
 39. Id. at 685. 
 40. Id. at 684-85. 
 41. Id. at 678-79. 
 42. See generally Frontiero, 411 U.S. 577 (plurality opinion). 
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the traditionally constructed normative social roles of the male and female 
sexes.43  But the plurality’s cursory assessment of the origins of “gender 
discrimination” and its failure to clearly articulate the subtle distinctions 
between sex and gender inadvertently gave rise to the conflation of the two 
terms. 
The Court subsequently affirmed this mistaken conflation of sex and 
gender in its review of Kahn v. Shevin,44 Schlesinger v. Ballard,45 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeny,46 and Craig v. Boren.47  
Throughout the entirety of these opinions, the terms sex and gender are 
carelessly used interchangeably,48 setting forth imprecisely reasoned 
discussions that occasionally resulted in what a majority (or plurality) of 
the Court considered an equitable result.   
In contrast to the law that was previously struck-down in Frontiero, a 
majority of the Court in Kahn v. Shevin affirmed a Florida statute that 
provided greater tax exemptions for widows than it did widowers.49  In an 
opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court distinguished 
                                                          
 43. See Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 126; Franke, supra note 11, 
at 70; cf. Andrew Gilden, Preserving Seeds of Gender Fluidity: Tribal Courts and the 
Berdache Tradition, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 237, 244 (2007); Yoshino, supra note 
11, at 361-62. 
 44. 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 n.10 (1974) (holding that a Florida statute did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause and was valid, and noting that “gender has never been 
rejected as an impermissible classification in all instances”). 
 45. 419 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1975) (holding that the statutory scheme according to 
which women naval officers require a thirteen year tenure of commissioned service 
before mandatory discharge for want of promotion, while requiring the mandatory 
discharge of male officers who are twice passed over for promotion but who might 
have less than thirteen years of commissioned services, did not violate the Due Process 
Clause in light of the Court’s failure to address the underlying discriminatory practice 
that prohibited the female sex to engage in combat and its application of a chauvinistic 
protection of the female sex based on archaic presumptions). 
 46. 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (holding—through a very cursory assessment of the 
law’s legal history and fallacious reasoning—that Massachusetts’ veterans’ preference 
statute providing that all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be 
considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveteran did not deprive women 
of equal protection under the law, despite the statute’s actual application). 
 47. 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding that “gender-based” classifications must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives, and that statistical evidence as to incidence of drunken 
driving among males and females between the ages of 18 and 21 was insufficient to 
support the “gender-based” discrimination arising from the Oklahoma statute in 
question). 
 48. See, e.g., Feeny, 442 U.S. at 267, 274; Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-03; Schlesinger, 
419 U.S. at 506-07; Kahn, 416 U.S. at 354-53, 355 n.10. 
 49. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 352. 
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the law from the one invalidated the preceding term by arguing that, unlike 
Frontiero, Florida had enacted the statute to “rectify the effects of past 
discrimination against women.”50  The Court’s reasoning, however, was 
informed by archaic socio-cultural stereotypes of the female sex as less 
qualified and dependent on males, paternalistically asserting that “[g]ender 
has never been rejected as an impermissible classification in all 
instances.”51  Consequently, the Court, much to the chagrin of Justice 
Brennan, defended the law on the very same sex-normative stereotypes and 
stigmatization that it rejected in Frontiero.52 
By the time the Court deemed unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute 
setting the legal age of alcohol consumption of the male and female sexes 
at twenty-one and eighteen, respectively, the practice of conflating the 
terms sex and gender was deeply entrenched within the Court’s analysis.53  
The Oklahoma statute was premised on statistical evidence that allegedly 
supported findings that males under the age of twenty-one were more likely 
to drive recklessly under the influence of alcohol54 than their female 
counterparts.55  While the statistical findings of the Oklahoma legislature 
appeared to be premised solely on the basis of sex, the Court proceeded 
under an analysis that included references to gender expressive conduct 
closely associated with society’s sex-normative stereotypes: 
The very social stereotypes that find reflection in age-differential laws, 
are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of these comparative 
statistics.  Hence “reckless” young men who drink and drive are 
transformed into arrest statistics, whereas their female counterparts are 
chivalrously escorted home.56 
Nonetheless, the greatest failure of the Court’s reasoning was its 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 356 n.8. 
 51. Id. at n.10. 
 52. See id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that classifications based on 
either sex or gender, like classifications based on race, must be subject to strict 
scrutiny); see also id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting) (finding that “gender-based” 
classifications are inherently suspect); accord Feeny, 442 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the plurality’s cursory assessment of a law that it deemed 
“gender-neutral” perpetuates what the Court had previously invalidated by limiting 
females to occupations previously regarded as falling into society’s sex-normative 
stereotypical roles); Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 511 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the majority’s troublesome failure to address the larger issue of the Navy’s 
discriminatory practice in prohibiting females’ assignment to roles considered improper 
for the female sex). 
 53. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 190. 
 54. Admittedly deemed “nonintoxicating” 3.2% beer by the plurality.  Id. at 191-
92. 
 55. Id. at 200-01. 
 56. Id. at 202 n.14. 
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recognition of what it had come to understand as the “relevant differences” 
between the male and female sexes.57  The recognition of these so-called 
relevant differences permitted the Court to build its “gender 
discrimination” jurisprudence on “the presumption, that on a fundamental 
level, males and females are not similarly situated.”58  Consequently, the 
reasoning of the Court in Craig v. Boren solidified two striking 
malfeasances.  First, by erroneously accepting that certain biological 
characteristics enable the law to regard the male and female sexes as totally 
different beings, the Court eradicated the possibility of ever achieving true 
equality amongst those who vary the established binary with regard to sex 
and gender.59  This first malfeasance allowed the Court to essentially 
endorse “gender discriminatory” conduct by disaggregating the terms “sex” 
and “gender” to the benefit of certain moral whims.60  In essence, it 
permitted biology to serve as “[an] excuse of cover for social practices that 
hierarchize individual members of” the male sex over members of the 
female sex or to serve as an excusable pretext for judicial application of 
Christian morals, affirming certain sex-normative stereotypes of the binary 
construct of male and female.61  Second, the Court’s reasoning bolstered a 
“gender discriminatory” worldview in which members of the transgender 
community are a subhuman species because they fall neither physically nor 
psychologically into what the Court has recognized as the constructions of 
the male and female sexes.62 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 199 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972)). 
 58. Franke, supra note 11, at 11; see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 
127, 146 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“But to say that gender makes no 
difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference as a matter 
of fact.”); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1975). 
 59. Franke, supra note 11, at 11. 
 60. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (holding that a federal statute 
making it more difficult for a child born abroad out of wedlock to one United States 
parent to claim citizenship if that parent was the father did not violate the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because 
of the Court’s “acknowledg[ment] of basic biological differences” between the sexes); 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (holding that a Georgia statute 
criminalizing sodomy was constitutional); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 
1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding no equal protection violation where a transsexual 
airline employee was terminated as a pilot); Sommers v. Budget Mktg, Inc., 667 F.2d 
748, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 
(9th Cir. 1977); cf. Yoshino, supra note 11, at 362, 373. 
 61. Franke, supra note 11, at 3; see Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (“Proscriptions 
against [homosexual] conduct have ancient roots.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087; Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 39; 
Yoshino, supra note 11, at 371. 
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IV. THE FLAWED APPLICATION OF UNDERSTANDING OF IDENTITY 
Much like the legal inequities suffered by individuals whose genders 
manifest directly in conflict with their sexes, members of the gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual communities have also struggled to attain constitutional 
protections against discrimination premised on their sexual orientation.63  
This struggle finds its origin within the first malfeasance indoctrinated into 
the “gender discrimination” analysis.64 
Bowers v. Hardwick provides a glaring example of the Court’s erroneous 
understanding of identity within the context of its “gender discrimination” 
jurisprudence.65  There, in a five-to-four ruling, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing oral and anal sex 
in private between consenting adults when applied to relations between 
homosexuals.  Writing for the majority, Justice Byron R. White failed to 
recognize the interest respondent Hardwick66 had at stake and 
contemptuously mischaracterized the issue in terms of what the majority 
merely considered reprehensible conduct.67  As a consequence, Michael 
Hardwick’s sexual orientation—a facet of his innate identity—was 
distorted into nothing more than capriciously wicked conduct.  By 
engaging in this mischaracterization, however, the Court—yet again—
rendered its judgment on the basis of archaic socio-cultural, sex-normative 
stereotypes of the roles of the male and female sex.68  To the Bowers Court, 
                                                          
 63. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute 
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain consensual 
intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that an amendment to 
Colorado’s constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action 
designed to protect persons identifying as either homosexual or bisexual from 
discrimination was unconstitutional and violated the Equal Protection Clause); Bowers, 
478 U.S. at 188-90; Perry v. Brown, 671 F.2d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
California’s ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional under an equal protection 
and due process analysis). 
 64. See supra Part II. 
 65. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188. 
 66. Id. at 188.  A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court of Georgia’s judgment and held that “the 
Georgia statute violated [Hardwick]’s fundamental rights because his homosexual 
activity is a private and intimate association that is beyond the reach of state 
regulation” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See id. at 189 (citing Hardwick v. 
Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 67. Id. at 188, 190, 192-93; see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(likening homosexuality to “reprehensible” acts such as murder and cruelty to animals). 
 68. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. 
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rejecting discriminatory practices based on sexual orientation was 
perceived as an endorsement of homosexual conduct and an advancement 
in the Court’s understanding of the “gender discrimination” doctrine that 
remained outside the comfort of the majority’s moral compass.69 
It would take the Court another seventeen years to adopt an analytical 
standard remotely similar to that which Justice Brennan originally alluded 
in Frontiero.70  In reexamining the issue posed to the Bowers Court, on 
behalf of the Court’s majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy explicitly 
acknowledged the Court’s previous “failure to appreciate the extent of the 
liberty at stake.”71  Further, in rejecting its previous reasoning regarding the 
consensual acts between persons expressing the intimacy of a relationship, 
the Court embraced a more “transcendent[ly] dimension[ional]”72 
understanding of an individual’s constitutionally protected liberty, stating: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mysteries of 
human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.73 
                                                          
 69. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing that the “condemnation” 
of homosexuality is “firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards” and 
characterizing it as “‘the infamous crime against nature’ as an offense of ‘deeper 
malignity’ than rape, a heinous act ‘the very mention of which is a disgrace to human 
nature,’ and ‘a crime not fit to be named’” (quoting, in part, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *215)); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-
51 (1992) (finding reliance in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)); Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt, supra note 5, at 186. 
 70. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct 
when it was decided, it is not correct today, and is hereby overruled.”).  For other 
efforts by the Court to broaden the scope of its “gender discrimination” jurisprudence, 
see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519, 545 (1996) (holding that Virginia 
failed to show an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for excluding women from the 
citizen-soldier program at the Virginia Military Institute, and, therefore, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996) (holding that a 
Mississippi statute that terminated a mother’s parental rights and precluded her ability 
to file an appeal on the basis of an astronomical preparation fee was in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994) 
(applying the reasoning of Batson to efforts of precluding members of the female sex 
from sitting as panelists on a jury); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
719 (1982) (holding that a Mississippi statute that excludes males from enrolling in a 
state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 72. Id. at 562. 
 73. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
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In essence, by affirming the Court’s reasoning initially imparted in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,74 the Court 
promulgated within its interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments an “interweaving of autonomy and dignity” 
interests75 that safeguards one’s individual right to determine and express 
one’s core identity.76 
The Court additionally recognized in Lawrence that the Texas statute did 
more than criminalize what the Court had previously deemed “homosexual 
sodomy.”77  In that regard, the Court rejected arguments trivializing the 
disparate treatment suffered by individuals convicted for violating Texas’ 
criminal statute, noting that those convictions would permanently remain 
on the individuals’ records and carry a collateral consequence of forever 
being condemned as sexual offenders.78  Indeed, in the eyes of the majority, 
the statute criminalized a portion of an individual’s core identity and 
promoted discrimination against persons whose identities failed to comport 
with what some members of the Bowers Court had considered “normal.”79  
                                                          
 74. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis requires 
reaffirming Roe v. Wade’s central conclusion recognizing a woman’s right to choose an 
abortion before fetal viability notwithstanding its rejection of the trimester framework 
and adoption of an undue burden test).  The matter to which the Court referenced was 
its prior recognition of the right of the individual to make “personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education” found within the penumbras of the Constitution.  Id. at 847-51. 
 75. Feldblum, The Right to Define, supra note 7, at 124. 
 76. Pomerantz, supra note 6, at 1217 (arguing that universities should permit 
transgender students to choose a gender-specific dorm based on gender identity rather 
than their biological sex). 
 77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (2003) (referencing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
190, 192 (1986)). 
 78. Id. at 575-76.  One need not look far to see the social injustices faced by 
members of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities.  A conviction of criminalized 
“homosexual conduct” had grave consequences, many of which were the result of 
Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children coalition, which propounded conservative Christian 
beliefs regarding the sinfulness of homosexuality and the perceived threat of 
homosexual recruitment of children through child molestation.  Further, efforts by 
other public activists throughout the 1960s and 1970s would have banned members of 
the lesbian, gay, and bisexual communities and their supporters from working within 
public schools.  See CRAIG RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN 
AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (Temple U. Press 2008); see also, 
e.g., Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 (1966). 
 79. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192; id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see 
Lawrence, 349 U.S. at 567, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that criminalizing 
conduct common in homosexual relationships would invite discrimination even if the 
statute was held unenforceable on equal protection grounds); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 636, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that discrimination against 
homosexuality is not as reprehensible as racial discrimination, and portraying those 
15
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Thus, by appreciating an individual’s liberty interest in self-identification, 
the Court repudiated the criminal statute for bolstering a social 
stigmatization that infringed on the dignity of the individual’s identity.  It 
observed that the stigma wrongly created portrayals of John Lawrence, 
Tyron Garner (his sexual companion), and others who identify as lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual as part of a subhuman species.80 
Although the Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual’s liberty 
interest in one’s core identity provided tremendous leaps toward a greater 
understanding of the right to self-autonomy, Lawrence equally functions as 
a missed opportunity to bridge the remaining gap in the Court’s 
development of “gender discrimination” jurisprudence.  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its previous decisions in Roe v. 
Wade81 and Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, but it 
failed to acknowledge the nexus among the three.82  Roe, Casey, and 
Lawrence all maintained one striking similarity to the Court’s decision in 
Frontiero: the infringements on the individual’s right to self-identify and to 
manifest his or her own destiny were premised on a rejection of sex-
normative stereotypes about the roles of the male and female sexes.83  
Therefore, the unconstitutional violation of substantive due process within 
the cases all fundamentally comport with “gender discriminatory” 
conduct.84 
For example, much like the social stigmatization of gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals through the criminalization of same-sex physically intimate 
conduct,85 the stigmatization that members of the female sex face through 
the criminalization of abortion are equally adverse.86  In his concurring 
opinion within Casey, Justice Harold A. Blackmun recognized the inherent 
                                                          
who would acknowledge the existence of an individual liberty interest in self-identity 
for members of the lesbian, bisexual, and gay communities as villainous). 
 80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575; see also supra Part II (discussing the second 
malfeasance created by the Court’s acceptance of the relevant differences doctrine). 
 81. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a Texas criminal abortion statute 
prohibiting a woman’s right to abort a pregnancy at any stage except to save the life of 
the mother was unconstitutional.  410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
 82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565, 573-74. 
 83. See Brown, supra note 12, at 1505; Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 375; Tribe, 
supra note 1, at 1902-04. 
 84. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Casey, 505 U.S. at 929 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in judgment, and dissenting in part). 
 85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 86. See Brown, supra note 12, at 1505, 1541; Tribe, supra note 1, at 1902-04, 
1926-27. 
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gender-discriminatory suffering of females who reject the archaic sex-
normative stereotypical role of motherhood: 
A state’s restrictions on a women’s right to terminate her pregnancy also 
implicates constitutional guarantees of gender equality . . . .  By 
restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts 
women’s bodies into service, forcing women to continue their 
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and, in most instances, 
provide years of maternal care.  The State does not compensate women 
for these services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter 
of course.87 
Indeed, throughout Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Casey, and 
throughout the majority opinion he authored in Roe v. Wade, Justice 
Blackmun emphasized the social stigmatization of females who faced 
unwed motherhood.88  While unwed motherhood would not commonly 
result in the collateral consequence of being labeled a sex offender, it could 
result in the collateral consequence of bearing society’s badge of shame, 
comparable to the proverbial “scarlet letter.”89 
Ultimately, the stigmatization suffered by Hardwick, Lawrence, and Roe 
derives directly from the archaic socio-normative stereotypes that mandate 
how the male and female sexes are “supposed” to behave by presuming 
that males and females are fundamentally different.90  The violative 
government conduct that infringed upon the right to self-indentify operates 
under the following two theories: (1) males engaging in “immoral” 
homosexual sodomy violate “biological” and “natural” law by participating 
in non-procreative sex;91 and (2) females who sought to abort their 
pregnancies violated “natural” law by rejecting the “biological” role of 
                                                          
 87. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
judgment, and dissenting in part); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171 
(2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases 
challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control over her [own] destiny.’ . . .  
There was a time, not so long ago, when women were ‘regarded as the center of home 
and family life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and 
independent legal status under the Constitution.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 88. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 923; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“In other cases, as in this 
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be 
involved.”). 
 89. Indeed, much like Nathaniel Hawthorne’s character, Hester Prynne, many of 
Roe’s unwed female contemporaries would bear and beget children that would serve as 
the embodiment of a badge of sin and shame for all to see.  See NATHANIEL 
HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 3, The Modern Library (Ross C. Murin ed., Boston 
1991); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (“[A female’s] suffering is too intimate and 
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, 
however dominant that vision has been in the course of history and our culture.”). 
 90. See Franke, supra note 11, at 11; cf. Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 38. 
 91. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986). 
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preserving the continuation of the human species through the assumed roles 
of spouse and mother.92 
But while the Supreme Court has invalidated government action that 
operates under the erroneous assumptions of the acceptable roles of the 
male and female sexes, the Court has failed to recognize that these 
unconstitutional violations of substantive due process constitute “gender 
discriminatory” conduct.93  Because the Court has failed to fully realize that 
safeguards to one’s individual right to determine and express one’s core 
identity94 are synonymous with safeguards against gender discrimination, 
lower courts continue to operate under a defective equal protection 
analysis, erroneously assessing claims arising out of government action or 
out of an action of private citizens that infringes on a claimant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.95  Consequently, the Court’s failure precludes the 
achievement of true equality among the sexes and the gender variant.96  
Accordingly, federal appellate courts will continue their debate as to what 
“gender discrimination” is and whether jurisprudence evaluating the 
subject extends to members of the transgender community.97 
V. THE CONFLICT DEFINED: THE UNCERTAINTY OF PROTECTIONS 
AFFORDED UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case relating to the constitutional 
rights of transgender individuals outside the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment.98  As a 
                                                          
 92. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) 
(invalidating a state statute that required prior written consent of the spouse of a 
pregnant female seeking an abortion unless the abortion was necessary to protect the 
life of the mother); Roe, 410 U.S. at 142-43 (documenting the American Medical 
Association Committee on Criminal Abortion’s views in the nineteenth century on 
abortion when the life of the mother was not in danger). 
 93. See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 386. 
 94. Pomerantz, supra note 6, at 1217 (noting the Court’s failure to adequately 
protect the transgender culture and positing that universities should allow students to 
self-identify with a particular gender in accordance with due process). 
 95. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides, in 
relevant part, that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 96. See Franke, supra note 11, at 11. 
 97. Compare Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011), Smith v. 
City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2004), and Schwenk v. Hartford, 
204 F.3d 1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2000), with Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 
1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007), and Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 
(7th Cir. 1984). 
 98. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding that “prison officials 
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result, lower courts continue to debate the meaning of “gender 
discrimination” and whether the doctrine’s jurisprudence extends to 
members of the transgender community suffering prejudicial conduct 
ultimately leading to the wrongful termination of their employment.99  
Further, the Court’s conflation and disaggregation of the terms “sex” and 
“gender” and its mistaken recognition of the “relevant differences” between 
the male and female sexes have provided lower courts free range to deny 
constitutional protections by using outdated biological concepts as a 
scathing pretext.100 
                                                          
may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of 
confinement only if they know that an inmate faces substantial risk of serious harm and 
disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it”).  In fact, Dee 
Farmer’s transgender status was ancillary to the Court’s interpretation of its previous 
understanding of the Eight Amendment, and the only sentiment the majority imparted 
regarding Farmer’s status was the belief that those who are transgender suffer “‘[a] rare 
psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her 
anatomical sex’ and who typically seeks medical treatment including hormonal therapy 
and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change.”  Id. at 829 (citing AM. MED. 
ASSOC., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 74-75 (3d rev. ed. 
1987) [hereinafter DSM-III]. 
 99. See generally Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316; Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218; Smith, 378 
F.3d at 567-68; Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2002) (per 
curiam); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 748-
49 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566, F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 
1977), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 100. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1218 (holding that the dismissal of a transgender 
individual’s claims was permissible); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 
1995) (holding that a transgender inmate’s allegation that some prisoners were given 
hormone therapy when others were not was not sufficient to state a claim for which 
relief could be granted under a theory of equal protection); Creed v. Family Express 
Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *5, *9-11 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) 
(denying Ms. Creed protections under Title VII and concluding that the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins did not extend to sex-specific dress 
codes); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45-46 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005) (concluding that the denial of a transgender claimant’s right to use the 
women’s restroom did not amount to gender discriminatory conduct); Johnson v. Fresh 
Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998-1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (concluding that the 
discharge of a transgender employee after she refused to use the men’s room did not 
amount to a violation of Title VII of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Oiler v. 
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 
16, 2002) (disdainfully referring to plaintiff as a “cross-dresser” and denying Title VII 
protections); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (stating that the transgender community is not protected under Title VII in claims 
instigated by employers who forbid transgender plaintiffs from using women’s 
restrooms); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (holding that plaintiff was 
not to be permitted to use the women’s restroom because she was not “biologically 
female”). 
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While not the first court to address whether Title VII extends 
constitutional protections to a transgender individual, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines, Inc.,101 has become the leading rationale in denying Title VII’s 
extension of constitutional safeguards to transgender persons in order to 
combat incidents of workplace discriminatory conduct brought on by 
private citizens.102  In Judge Harlington Wood, Jr.’s deplorably brief six-
page opinion, he demonstrates a conspicuous perpetuation of the “gender 
discrimination” jurisprudential deficiencies by disaggregating sex from 
gender.103 Through his authorship, the court adopts a fallacious 
presupposition that sex is biologically defined solely by the fundamental 
presence of “chromosomes, internal and external genitalia, hormones, and 
gonads” that are generally correlative to one sex in Euro-American 
society’s binary construction of male and female.104  Thus, the court failed 
to engage in any inquiry that may have engendered an understanding that 
sex is purely a perceived identity related to, but not determinative of, one’s 
innate gender.105 
Rather, the court institutionally denigrated a person’s transgender status 
as “[a] rare psychiatric disorder,”106 or as an existence comprised of paltry, 
unaccepted “cultural attitudinal characteristic[s].”107  Even more 
                                                          
 101. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 102. While the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are self-executing against government action, Section 5 of the 
Amendment as well as Clause 3 within Section 8 of Article I of the United States 
Constitution provide the special role of Congress in promulgating constitutional 
protections against private conduct.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 244-45 (1964) (upholding congressional regulation of private conduct under 
the Article I, Section 8, Clause 3); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-04 
(1964) (delineating, further, congressional power to regulate private conduct under the 
combined functions of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (denying 
regulation solely under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 103. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083-84. 
 104. Id. at 1083 n.5-6. 
 105. Id. at 1083 n.6, 1084. 
 106. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994); Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3 
(relying on AM. MED. ASSOC., supra note 98, at 1006); see also DSM III, supra note 
98, at 261-63. 
 107. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084-86 (reviewing congressional intent of the 1964 Act 
with respect to rights of transgender individuals); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 158 n.1 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Individuals who identified 
as homosexual suffered a similar institutional stigmatization of a mental disease until 
the sexual orientation was declassified as such during early 1986.  See RONALD BAYER, 
HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (2d ed. 
1987).  Indeed, some scholars have completely rejected applications of the “gender 
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reprehensible, however, is the court’s overtly contemptuous portrayal of 
Karen Ulane’s efforts to correct the world’s perception of her identity by 
conforming her outward appearance to her core identity: 
[I]t may be that society, as the trial judge found, considers Ulane to be 
female.  But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created 
from what remains of a man, that does not decide the case.  If Eastern 
[Airlines] had considered Ulane to be female and had discriminated 
against her because she was female . . . then the argument might be made 
that Title VII applied . . . but that is not this case.  It is clear from 
evidence that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not 
because she is female.”108 
                                                          
discrimination” doctrine to members of the transgender community.  See, e.g., Hispanic 
AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Elkind, 
supra note 7, at 904.  Instead, these scholars suggest that “considering transgenderism 
as a disorder may more easily facilitate protections,” either under an application of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act or a broader equal protection analysis.  See, e.g., 
Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 47; Elkind, supra note 7, at 903. 
Nevertheless, these propositions are misconceived.  First, within the scope of a broader 
equal protection claim, the Supreme Court has noted that discrimination resulting from 
mental disability or illness is not subjected to a heightened standard of scrutiny.  See 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (requiring the 
government to propound merely a rational basis for the discriminatory conduct).  
Second, framing transgender identity as a mental disability acquiesces to arguments 
that the transgender identity is a serious medical and psychological problem that 
constitutes a serious medical need.  See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th 
Cir. 1995); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. 
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987).  Additionally, it continues to perpetuate a 
negative stigma on the transgender identity that only furthers animus.  Cf. Pomerantz, 
supra note 6, at 1225 (“This medicalization has permeated American jurisprudence, 
which reflects the tending to pathologise transgenderism and ignore the complexities of 
transgender identity.”). 
Continued reliance of the medicalization of the transgender identity only reaffirms a 
misunderstanding between the transgender identity and contrasting genitalia.  This 
misunderstanding and reliance on the false binary construct of the male and female 
sexes additionally reifies notions that if a transgender individual is provided any 
constitutional protection, it will be only after he or she undergoes gender corrective 
surgery.  Phyllis Frye notes many problems with relying on the surgical standard: “The 
most common reason for delaying surgery is the cost, which can run from $3,000 to 
$40,000 depending on whether the person is [a male-to-female] or [female-to-male] 
and the type of corrections desired.”  Frye, supra note 24, at 160 n.118.  The presence 
of “genitalia is not the sole indicator of sex.”  Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. 
Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004), 
aff’d, 325 F. App’x 492 (9th Cir. 2009).  Further, demanding details about the 
transgender individual’s genitalia implicates an individual’s right to privacy in personal 
information.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (describing two kinds of 
privacy interests: informational privacy and decisional privacy).  Mostly importantly, it 
completely distorts the cognizable issue: “gender discrimination.” 
 108. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (relying on Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 
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Embracing the Supreme Court’s second malfeasance,109 the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion portrays Ulane as nothing more than a subhuman species 
precluded from any constitutionally based protections under Title VII 
because—in the eyes of the court—she was neither male nor female, but, 
rather the scientific creation of accomplished doctors.110  In sum, Judge 
Wood’s malign discussion of Ulane’s plight effectively removed Ulane’s 
humanity and thus eviscerated the humanity of the transgender identity.111 
While much of Ulane’s reasoning has been presumably overruled,112 
many courts encountering similarly situated claimants continue to espouse 
a bereft assessment of the terms sex and gender and derisively use the 
medicalization of the transgender identity to deny any and all legal 
recourse.113  As recently as 2009, the United States District Court for the 
District of Indiana declined to grant Title VII protections to a transgender 
claimant wrongfully terminated from her employment because she refused 
to conform to a male sex-specific physical presentation while working.114  
Without question, the workplace has maintained its status, since the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ulane, as a battleground on which the fight 
for transgender equality continues to be overwhelmingly disastrous.115 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s explicit extension of Title VII 
claims to discriminatory conduct premised on archaic, sex-normative 
                                                          
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 
2000)). 
 109. See supra Part II. 
 110. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087 (relying on Sommers v. Budget Mtkg., Inc., 667 F.2d 
748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), and Holloway, 566 F.2d 659, overruled by Schwenk, 
204 F.3d 1187); see also Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 39.  
 111. See generally Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining 
Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 329, 345 (1999). 
 112. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (declining to 
follow Ulane and arguing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 190 (1989) (redefining the protections afforded under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964), eviscerates discriminatory practices against transgender 
individuals by concluding the archaic conduct of sex-stereotyping unconstitutional).  
 113. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); Brown v. 
Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995); Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-
CV-465, 2009 WL 35237 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009); Johnson v. Fresh Mark., Inc., 337 F. 
Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-
3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717 
(Minn. 2001); Hispanic AIDS Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 52 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005).  
 114. See Creed, No. 3:06-CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *1, *10 (N.D. Ind. 2009). 
 115. See, e.g., Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1000; Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 287; Goins, 
635 N.W.2d at 725; Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
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stereotypes,116 lower courts have continued to use the disaggregation of sex 
and gender in addition to the false binary construct to deny transgender 
employees any legal remedy.117  Most notably, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority118 
provides yet another case that chronicles the very conduct the Supreme 
Court invalidated in Frontiero119 and Price Waterhouse,120 particularly 
within the context of discriminatory conduct against transgender persons in 
the workplace. 
Krystal Etsitty presented the appellate court with two Title VII claims of 
wrongful termination.121  First, she averred that she was wrongfully 
terminated on the basis of her transgender status.122  Second, she contended 
that she was wrongfully terminated for refusing to conform to Utah Transit 
Authority’s “expectations of stereotypically male behavior,” in that she 
used women’s bathrooms along her assigned bus routes.123  The court 
rejected Etsitty’s first claim by adopting the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Ulane that unlawful sex discrimination must only be viewed as the 
“unlawful . . . discriminat[ion] against women because they are women and 
men because they are men,”124 thereby disaggregating sex from gender 
once more.  Much like the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit failed to 
extend any constitutionally based protections under Title VII to Etsitty 
because she did not comport with the illusory binary construct of male and 
female recognized in the Supreme Court’s long-standing “gender 
discrimination” jurisprudence.125 
In addition, the appellate court declined to abide by the Supreme Court’s 
explicit extension of Title VII claims to discriminatory conduct premised 
                                                          
 116. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court concluded that Title VII’s 
prohibit of sex discrimination included discriminatory conduct based on an individual’s 
rejection of the sex-normative stereotypes that have traditionally defined the acceptable 
behavior and roles of the male and female sexes.  490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989).   
 117. See, e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1220; Brown, 63 F.3d at 971; Creed, No. 3:06-
CV-465, 2009 WL 35237, at *6; Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d 996; Oiler, No. Civ.A. 00-
3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6; Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at 284; Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 
725; Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
 118. See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1215. 
 119. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
 120. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. 
 121. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1220-21. 
 122. Id. at 1218-19. 
 123. Id. at 1218, 1224. 
 124. Id. at 1221 (relying on Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 
(7th Cir. 1984)). 
 125. See supra Part II. 
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on archaic, sex-normative stereotypes.126  Although the court 
acknowledged that “use of a restroom is an inherent part of one’s 
identity,”127 it dismissed any argument that Etsitty’s transgender status 
inherently did not conform with sex-normative stereotypes.128  Instead, the 
court extended the false binary construct of biological sex by concluding: 
Etsitty may not claim protection under Title VII based upon her 
transsexuality per se.  Rather, Etsitty’s claim must rest entirely on the 
Price Waterhouse theory of protection as a man who fails to conform to 
sex stereotypes.  However far Price Waterhouse reaches, this court 
cannot conclude it requires employers to allow biological males to use 
women’s restrooms.  Use of a restroom designated for the opposite sex 
does not constitute a mere failure to conform to sex stereotypes.129 
The Tenth Circuit’s judgment is erroneous.  Even though the court 
suggested that bathroom access—whether in or outside the workplace—for 
the transgender individual is fundamentally related to an individual right to 
liberty, it nevertheless unreasonably concluded that discrimination against a 
transgender individual—because his or her innate gender is incongruent 
with a perceived sex or the normative, stereotypical roles of that sex—is 
outside the ambit of “gender discrimination” jurisprudence.130 
In contrast, other federal appellate and lower courts have determined that 
“all persons, whether transgender or not, are protected from discrimination 
on the basis of” sex-normative stereotypes.131  Although these courts 
adopted the Supreme Court’s reasoning within Price Waterhouse132 to 
extend protections to transgender persons, the vast majority of these courts 
did so through a misunderstanding of the transgender individual’s 
                                                          
 126. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224-25 (discussing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 250-52 (1989)). 
 127. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1226. 
 128. Id. at 1224-25. 
 129. Id. (incorrectly relying on Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864, 875 n.7 
(9th Cir. 2001)). 
 130. Id. at 1224-26, 1228. 
 131. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. 
City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572  (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. 
Enter., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 
213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008); Lopez v. River Oaks 
Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Mitchell 
v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. Civ.A 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 
2006); Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Comty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 
WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004), aff’d, 325 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Tronetti v. Healthnet Lakshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 
26, 2003).  But see Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 132. 490 U.S. at 256 (1989). 
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interests.133  Because these courts continue failing to fully appreciate the 
liberty interests at stake, they produce an ideology that similarly regards the 
transgender identity as inherently inferior.134 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. City of 
Salem, Ohio,135 demonstrates this predicament.  Despite the court’s 
extension of Title VII’s constitutionally-based protections to Smith through 
an adoption of the Price Waterhouse analysis, the court failed to recognize 
Smith’s transgender identity by improperly referring to Smith with 
masculine pronouns throughout its opinion.136  Admittedly, this failure to 
recognize Smith’s transgender identity in large part arises out of the 
manner in which Smith pled the case before the federal district and 
appellate courts.137  Admittedly, this begs the question whether Smith chose 
to portray herself as a male because she believed that an adoption of the 
Price Waterhouse analysis would have otherwise been foreclosed. 
An evaluation of other lower court opinions overwhelmingly suggests 
that, had Smith presented the claim on the basis of nonconformity with the 
assumed sex that is in comport with her innate gender, the presiding court 
would have likely declined an extension of Title VII protections under the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Price Waterhouse.138  Therefore, an 
application of Price Waterhouse suggests that a transgender claimant must 
assume the sex in conflict with his or her gender in order to be provided 
any constitutionally based protections.  It appears that the transgender 
claimant is required to embrace the second malfeasance within “gender 
discrimination” jurisprudence by falsely accepting the incorrect 
presumption that manifestations of his or her innate identity are merely a 
rejection of the employer’s binary construct of sex and gender.139 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d at 729; Smith, 378 F.3d at 566; Rosa, 214 F.3d at 
213; Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1187. 
 134. See generally Alfieri, supra note 5, at 828. 
 135. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572. 
 136. Id. at 566. 
 137. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response to the Court’s Show of Cause Order at 1, Smith v. 
City of Salem, Ohio, No. 4:02CV1405, 2003 WL 25720984 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2003), 
rev’d, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 138. See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d at 737-38; Rosa, 214 F.3d at 215-26; Lopez v. River 
Oaks, 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660-61 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, 
Inc., No. Civ.A 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006); Tronetti v. 
TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935, at *4 
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2003).   
 139. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (“What matters 
for purposes of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that [in] the mind of the 
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim: here, for example, the 
perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that he believed the victim was a man who 
‘failed to act like’ one.”); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 
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Accordingly, even sympathetic lower courts extending protections to 
transgender individuals partake in an erroneous analysis of the true 
interests at stake.  “Gender discrimination” is substantially more complex 
than conduct resulting in the disparate treatment of an individual premised 
on one’s sex.  “Gender discrimination” offends the very core of an 
individual’s inborn identity.  But without explicit recognition from the 
Supreme Court that “gender discrimination” is premised on more than 
conduct resulting in the disparate treatment of one’s sex, the possibility of 
consistent extensions of constitutional protections to transgender persons 
remains nebulous.  Is it possible, however, that another branch of the 
United States government may provide the requisite understanding to 
safeguard the transgender person’s rights?  
VI. REDEFINING “GENDER DISCRIMINATION” AND BROADENING THE 
SCOPE OF PROTECTION 
On April 20, 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(EEOC) released an administrative adjudicatory opinion explicitly 
providing Title VII’s protections to members of the transgender 
community.140  Many advocates have begun to argue that the EEOC has 
handed transgender claimants a breakthrough victory that provides reliable 
legal protection.141  To be sure, an administrative agency such as the EEOC 
is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative 
proceeding,142 and courts generally defer to an agency’s conclusion when 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise issue.143  But transgender 
advocates should view the agency’s decision with at least some trepidation.  
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the EEOC’s guidance in 
interpreting Title VII, the Court has nonetheless determined that the 
EEOC’s guidelines are not binding authority.144  In addition, the EEOC’s 
                                                          
2008). 
 140. Macy, EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *16 (April 20, 
2012). 
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Enforcement, JD SUPRA LAW NEWS (Apr. 30, 2012), 
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Chris Geidner, Transgender Breakthrough: EEOC Ruling That Gender-Identity 
Discrimination Is Covered by Title VII Is a “Sea Change” That Opens the Doors to 
Employment Protection for Transgender Amerians, METRO WEEKLY (Apr. 23, 2012, 
10:38 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/news/?ak=7288 (citing Masen Davis of the 
Transgender Law Center and Shannon Minter of the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights). 
 142. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974). 
 143. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 144. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), superseded on 
other grounds by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 §1, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 
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decision, although favorable to the transgender claimant, inadvertently 
supports the continued adoption of the Court’s second malfeasance within 
“gender discrimination” jurisprudence by assuming that manifestations of 
the transgender claimant’s identity are merely a rejection of the judiciary’s 
conflated understanding of sex and gender.145 
As a result, lower courts unpersuaded by arguments requesting the 
adoption of the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse analysis to issues 
involving the transgender community will likely remain unyielding because 
of the judiciary’s continued failure to understand the complex 
interrelationship of sex and gender.  Thus, transgender claimants will 
continue struggling to garner the judiciary’s exercise of heightened scrutiny 
to invalidate the inequitable transgressions of government and private 
action until the Court rectifies its imprecise development of “gender 
discrimination” jurisprudence.146 
“Gender discrimination” is neither premised on the presence of 
rudimentary biological indicators nor is it the mere infringement upon the 
physicality of one’s person.147  “Gender discrimination” attacks the very 
core of an individual’s innate identity as well as the individual’s ability to 
manifest his or her own destiny.  Certainly, “gender discriminatory” 
conduct falls within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause.  But “gender 
discrimination” is, first and foremost, a violation of an individual’s 
substantive due process right to liberty.148  As Justice Kennedy observed in 
Lawrence: 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for 
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in 
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both 
interests.149 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning reflects the Court’s promising move 
                                                          
Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
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 147. See supra Part II. 
 148. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. 
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towards an acknowledgement that the equality and the liberty interests are 
“intertwined.”150  Therefore, while the Court’s opinion in Lawrence does, 
in part, function as a missed opportunity in protecting an individual’s 
inborn identity against “gender discrimination,” Lawrence also signals an 
explicit appreciation for claims asserted on the dual premises of equality 
and liberty by “str[iking] the chains of history from due process 
jurisprudence.”151 
Further, the Court’s recognition of substantive due process “liberty-
based dignity claim[s]”152 implicitly suggests a death knell to the antiquated 
equal protection methodology based upon highlighting the differences 
between claimants.153  To be sure, “[t]he Court left no doubt that it was 
protecting the equal liberty and dignity not of atomistic individuals torn 
from their social context, but of people as they relate to, and interact with, 
one another,”154 by emphasizing what we as humans all have in common.155  
One commonality that remains at the very “heart of liberty” is “the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.”156  Surely, government or private action 
resulting in “gender discrimination” constitutes infringement on the 
individual’s right to self-identify and to manifest his or her own destiny, 
premised on a rejection of sex-normative stereotypes about the roles of the 
male and female sexes.157 
Notwithstanding this glaringly obvious link between equality and liberty, 
lower courts will continue to operate under the judiciary’s misconceived 
understandings of sex, gender, and “gender discrimination.”158  
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court must redress its “gender discrimination” 
jurisprudence through an explicit recognition of liberty within its “gender 
discrimination” analyses. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article seeks to challenge archaic assumptions about sex and gender 
as well as the Supreme Court’s conflation and disaggregation of the two 
terms.  Judicial reliance on these outmoded assumptions has resulted in the 
complete impediment of achieving total gender equality by recognizing 
what the Court has deemed the “relevant differences” between the sexes.  
To members of the transgender community, this conflict is inescapable, and 
the law has generated grave uncertainty with little to no protective recourse 
for these conflicts as they arise within the workplace.  But until the Court 
rejects “conformance to a background social norm—i.e., that there must 
always be complete unity between sexual anatomy and gender identity—
those individuals”159 who maintain the transgender identity will continue to 
suffer disastrous consequences in the workplace. 
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